Those courts have adopted the plurality’s opinion as the most persuasive interpretation of §3582(c)(2). The United States claims that, in Marks, the Supreme Court constructed a majority holding in a case where five Justices reached the same conclusion using two inconsistent rationales, and that a similar approach was used in subsequent cases. See Fed. Brief for United States 52. But there are circumstances where the district court’s discretion is confined such that the Guidelines range does not play a meaningful part in the ultimate determination of the defendant’s sentence. The law professors explain that, under the current interpretation of Marks, justices have an incentive to join with other justices with whose narrower rationales they disagree in order to create a majority for a rule they support and would like the Court itself to be bound by. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. For example, in Koons the Court today holds that five defendants’ sentences were not “based on” subsequently lowered Guidelines ranges because in that case the Guidelines and the record make clear that the sentencing judge “discarded” their sen- tencing ranges “in favor of mandatory minimums and substantial-assistance factors.” Post, at 5–6; see also Molina-Martinez, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11) (“The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court  thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range”). 32a–33a. Hughes v Lord Advocate AC 837 Remoteness of damage in tort law; that the kind of damage must be foreseeable, rather than the specific damage that actually occurred. So too here: The Type-C agreement, and not the Guidelines calculation that preceded its acceptance, forms the basis for the sentence. for Cert. This Court granted certiorari.  “[T]he decision whether to accept the agreement will often be deferred until the sentencing hearing,” which means that “the decision whether to accept the plea agreement will often be made at the same time that the defendant is sentenced.” United States v. Hyde, 520 U. S. 670, 678 (1997). The opinion that follows resolves the sentencing issue in this case; and, as well, it should give the necessary guidance to federal district courts and to the courts of appeals with respect to plea agreements of the kind presented here and in Freeman.  The Court justifies this result by arguing that its rule ensures that “those who commit crimes of similar severity  under similar conditions receive similar sentences.” Ante, at 11. In short, experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of §3582(c)(2), the system Congress put in place is best implemented, as a systemic, structural matter, by the interpretation confirmed in the instant case. Indeed, the Guidelines are “the starting point for every sentencing calculation in the federal system.” Peugh, supra, at 542. In Freeman, Justice Sotomayor, concurring, and the plurality agreed that plea agreements could be within § 3582(c)(2); although, Justice Sotomayor stated that only those plea agreements which use the Guidelines’ sentencing range or cite the Guidelines as part of the rationale for the sentencing recommendation qualify.  Less than two months after the District Court sentenced Hughes, the Sentencing Commission adopted amendment 782 to the Guidelines. The prisoner maintained that his sentence should be reduced under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2) when his Guidelines sentencing range was lowered retroactively. In so doing, it calculated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and determined that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors the court was required to consider. But that is not so: With a Type-C agreement, the sentence is set by the parties, not by a judge applying the Guidelines. See ante, at 12–13. The facts of this case provide a striking illustration. Post Office workers were working underground and left the manhole unattended surrounded with kerosene lamps while on break. Plaintiff Hughes, an 8 year old boy, was playing at the unattended site and knocked over a kerosene lamp, which resulted in a huge explosion that threw him down the manhole. He suffered severe burns and sued Defendant. Even if a defendant is eligible for relief, before a district court grants a reduction it must consider “the factors set forth in  section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” and the Commission’s “applicable policy statements.” §3582(c)(2). See 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). The United States contends that Hughes’s interpretation will upset the mutual advantage necessary to bring the defendant and government to the table because Hughes’s reading of § 3582(c)(2) allows defendants to retain the primary benefit conferred by pleas, such as a reduction in sentence and the potential elimination of charges, while withdrawing the benefit to the government, such as the assurance of a particular sentence or sentencing range. I agree that when a district court has discretion to select an appropriate sentence, the resulting sentence can often be said to be based on the advisory Guidelines range. See Koons v. United States, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2) (a Guidelines range can be “overridden” by “a congressionally mandated minimum sentence”). The United States argues that the criminal justice system favors finality, which is why § 3582(c) does not generally allow for the modification of prison sentences, and that the modification allowed by this subsection is only a narrow exception to that general rule. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F. 3d 344, 348 (CA1 2011); United States v. Thompson, 682 F. 3d 285, 290 (CA3 2012); United States v. Brown, 653 F. 3d 337, 340, n. 1 (CA4 2011); United States v. Benitez, 822 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA5 2016); United States v. Smith, 658 F. 3d 608, 611 (CA6 2011); United States v. Dixon, 687 F. 3d 356, 359 (CA7 2012); United States v. Browne, 698 F. 3d 1042, 1045 (CA8 2012); United States v. Graham, 704 F. 3d 1275, 1277–1278 (CA10 2013). 849 F. 3d 1008, 1016 (2017); App. the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”,  The controlling issue here is whether a defendant may seek relief under §3582(c)(2) if he entered a plea agreement specifying a particular sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). When the Commission amends the Guidelines in a way that reduces the Guidelines range for “a particular offense or category of offenses,” the Commission must “specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced.” §994(u). Buy Tort Law (Spotlights) 1 by Hughes-Davies, Timon, Tamblyn, Nathan (ISBN: 9781138554597) from Amazon's Book Store. Likewise, a “base” is “[t]he starting point or foundational part of something,” or “[a] point, part, line, or quantity from which a reckoning or conclusion proceeds.” Ibid. Hughes then contends that, even under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Freeman is not binding law. 2 The economic loss doctrine precludes a party from recovering in tort if the party has suffered only an economic loss and, therefore, should pursue its remedy in contract instead of in tort.  Finally, as five Members of this Court recognized in Freeman, “[a]llowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply because the court itself considered the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement would transform §3582(c)(2) into a mechanism by which courts could rewrite the terms of (C) agreements in ways not contemplated by the parties.” 564 U. S., at 536–537 (opinion of Sotomayor, J. Pp. 9–12. 782 (Supp. In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349 (1993), we considered a provision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 providing an exception to a foreign state’s immunity when “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(2). The Court’s interpretation of §3582(c)(2) allows for just such revision, possibly many years down the line, when the Government has already fulfilled its side of the bargain. And in any event, “[w]hat is at stake in this case is a defendant’s eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief.” Id., at 532 (plurality opinion). This kind of plea agreement is sometimes referred to as a “Type-C agreement.”. I held the view that sentences imposed under Type-C agreements are typically “based on” the agreements themselves, not on the Guidelines. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Even within Circuits that follow the Freeman concurrence, unwarranted disparities have resulted depending on whether a defendant’s Type-C agreement has a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range. Both courts concluded that the Freeman concurrence stated the holding of this Court under Marks, and that under the concurrence’s interpretation Hughes was ineligible for a reduced sentence because his plea agreement did not expressly rely on a Guidelines range.  I therefore join the majority in full because doing so helps to ensure clarity and stability in the law and promotes “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted; emphasis deleted). The United States contends that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to Marks is superior because it allows for greater predictability and consistency in the application of decisions. The United States responds that the connection between the Guidelines, the plea agreement, and the sentencing is too tenuous. According to the United States, when the Marks rule is correctly applied to Freeman, the one-Justice concurrence agrees with the four-Justice plurality to the extent that some cases cannot be given reduced sentences under § 3582(c)(2). are all cases where the purported government negligence was premised solely on claims of negligent hiring and/or supervision. See Koons v. United States, post, at 5 (defendants’ Guidelines ranges “clearly did not” form a basis of the ultimate sentences). Some Courts of Appeals, turning to Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, for guidance, adopted the reasoning of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the judgment. “To hold otherwise would be to contravene the very purpose of (C) agreements—to bind the district court and allow the Government and the defendant to determine what sentence he will receive.” Id., at 536.  That commonsense understanding accords with our reading of the phrase “based upon” in the context of deciding when a cause of action is based upon particular con duct. And there is no reason a defendant’s eligibility for relief should turn on the form of his plea agreement. See Brief for Petitioner 34–35 (referring to the possibility of such an “explicit waiver”).   This case concerns the issue whether a defendant may seek relief under §3582(c)(2) if he entered a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (Type-C agreement), which permits the defendant and the Government to “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case,” and  “binds the court [to the agreed-upon sentence] once [it] accepts the plea agreement.” In making its decision, the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. §§ 29–20–101 to –408 (2000 & Supp.2010), against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) and Frank Archey (the “Defendant”), an employee of the Metro Public Works Department, for … to Pet.  Second, the Commission’s policy statement “seeks to isolate whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant’s sentence.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 530. And that range has since been lowered by the Commission. To resolve the uncertainty that resulted from this Court’s  divided decision in Freeman, the Court now holds that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. When the Government and a defendant enter a Type-C agreement, the district court has three choices: It “may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.” Rule 11(c)(3)(A). Even if a sentence is based on multiple causes, Hughes argues that, applying tort law, multiple causes may be equally and completely charged with a single result as long as each is a proximate cause. The District Court has discretion to decide whether to reduce Hughes’ sentence after considering the §3553(a)  factors and the Commission’s relevant policy statements. Specifically, I clarified that §3582(c)(2) relief was available in cases where the Type-C agreement “call[s] for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” or in cases where the “plea agreement . . . See Neb.Rev.Stat. First, the Government’s interpretation of §1B1.10 depends on an artificial distinction between a court’s decision to accept a Type-C agreement and its decision to impose the agreed-upon sentence. Facts: The defendants carelessly exposed their employee, a van driver (the claimant), to extreme cold in the course of his duties.The claimant suffered frost bite as a result. 35 terms. Two boys, aged 8 and 10, decided to explore an unattended manhole that had been left by workmen. for Cert. USSG §6B1.2(c). The Eleventh Circuit denied modification based on Freeman v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that sentences from plea deals are not based on the Guidelines, but Hughes contends that the circuit court incorrectly applied the 4-1-4 decision. 17–155. Argued March 27, 2018—Decided June 4, 2018, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1). Although in a Type-C agreement the Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, that bargain is contingent on the district court accepting the agreement and its stipulated sentence. The defendant was under the mistaken belief that the oats were old, when in fact they were new oats. Hughes contrasts this approach with the alternative used by the Eleventh Circuit, in which the court asked whether the concurring opinion would produce the same result as the plurality opinion, an approach that Hughes asserts incorrectly ignores whether there was agreement in the rationale. Accordingly, relief under §3582(c)(2) should be available to permit the district court to reconsider a prior sentence to the extent the prisoner’s Guidelines range was a relevant part of the framework the judge used to accept the agreement or determine the sentence. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to Marks, Hughes claims, creates indeterminacy because it is more difficult to predict the outcome that each opinion would yield. Under the revised Guidelines, Hughes’ sentencing range is 151 to 188 months—about three to four years lower than the range in effect when he was sentenced. Further, even within Circuits that follow the Freeman concurrence, unwarranted disparities have resulted depending on the fortuity of whether a defendant’s Type-C agreement includes a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range. When a defendant enters into a binding “Type-C” plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), however, the resulting sentence is “dictated by the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines calculation.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 536 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). Id., at 535–536. shares,” have contributed to ongoing discord among the lower courts, sown confusion among litigants, and left “the governing rule uncertain.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 354 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. Id., at 36a, 47a. 28a. Another is the situation before us, where Rule 11(c)(1)(C) compels the district court to sentence the defendant to a term chosen by the parties, or none at all. Though the Guidelines are only advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, a district court must consult them during sentencing, id., at 264, along with other factors specified in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities,” §3553(a)(6). See 21 U. S. C. §§841(b)(1)(A), 851(a). Given the standard legal definition of “base,” there will be no question in the typical case that the defendant’s Guidelines range was a basis for his sentence. To secure the sentence to which the parties already agreed, the Government likely will have to recreate the state of play from the original plea negotiations and sentencing to make counterfactual “what if” arguments—which, naturally, the defendant will then try to rebut. Thus, in general, §3582(c)(2) allows district courts to reconsider a prisoner’s sentence based on a new starting point—that is, a lower Guidelines range—and determine whether a reduction is appropriate.  If the Guidelines range was not “a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement,” Freeman, supra, at 530, then the defendant’s sentence was not based on that sentencing range, and relief under §3582(c)(2) is unavail- able. BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland is an important Supreme Court case which re-visited the scope of … Hughes argues that allowing sentencing reductions for defendants who agreed to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas makes plea bargaining more equitable, not less valuable to the government. But those cases—which do not concern the language of §3582(c)(2) or sentencing pursuant to Type-C agreements—do not inform the distinct question at hand. He has litigated and tried cases against the Midwest’s top toxic tort and transportation attorneys. Hughes argues that a majority of the Court must agree upon the principle of law, not the outcome, or else the reasoning of a single Justice could have controlling effect even though eight Justices disagreed. Hughes sought to modify his sentence under 15 U.S.C. for Cert. Ante, at 5; see App.  This interpretation furthers §3582(c)(2)’s purpose, as well as the broader purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. And it may not accept the agreement unless the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, or it is outside that range for justifiable reasons specifically set out. The amendment reduced the base offense level by two levels for most drug offenses. for Cert. But that ignores the crucial way in which Type-C defendants are not similarly situated to other defendants. The Court characterizes this distinction as “artificial,” arguing that the district court’s ultimate imposition of a sentence often has as much to do with its Guidelines calculation as anything else. The defendant took the sample. But, as the majority persuasively explains, that argument “has nothing to do with whether a defendant’s sentence was based on the Sentencing Guidelines under §3582(c)(2)” and therefore has no bearing on whether a defendant who has entered into a Type-C agreement is eligible for a sentence reduction.  A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant’s Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. § 3582(c)(2), which requires a sentence to be based on the Guidelines.  More recently, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ___ (2015), we found that a cause of action was not “based upon” commercial activity when the activity established just one element of the action. Hughes also contends that Congress intended to allow C-type plea recipients to modify sentencing arrangements under § 3582(c)(2) because doing so furthers the Sentencing Reform Act’s goal of ensuring that defendants who commit similar crimes receive similar sentences. The Court in Freeman split 4-1-4 on whether sentences pursuant to plea agreements were “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore amendable under § 3582(c)(2). This new textbook addresses a range of the most prominent torts. At stake are an important question of what portions of a plurality decision should bind lower courts, potential inequities regarding parties who may and may not have their sentences reduced, and a shift in power in plea negotiations. But “when determining the sentence to impose,” the district court may base its decision on “one thing and one thing only—the plea agreement.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 545 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). The phrase “based upon,” we explained, instead looks to “the core of [the] suit” and what the claims “turn on.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–8).  A principal purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to  promote “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Molina-Martinez, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted; emphasis deleted). Ibid. Experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of §3582(c)(2), as a systemic, structural matter the system Congress put in place is best implemented by the interpretation confirmed in this case. Thus, there is no meaningful difference between a court’s decision to accept  a Type-C agreement that includes a particular sentence and the court’s decision (sometimes, as here, just minutes later) to impose that sentence. If such circumstances exist, I expect that district courts will take that into account when deciding whether, and to what extent, a Type-C sentence should be reduced under §3582(c)(2). Settling this debate is unlikely to be as straightforward as the Court anticipates. Less than two months after Hughes’s sentencing, the Sentencing Commission modified the Sentencing Guidelines via Amendment 782. Filing 42. 11(c)(3)(A), (4), (5). ( Roberts, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Alito join, )... Tortious conduct Freeman v. United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 8, 2017 requires the Commission later amendment! Minority of courts apply a “logical subset” rule, requiring the holding to be released from his guilty.! ) ( 2 ) ’s purpose, as well as the most prominent torts handle car accidents, wills dog! Dissenting opinion, in my view, that general rule was not absolute for petitioner 34–35 referring!, 543 U. S. 522 ( 2011 ) ( Political Subdivisions tort claims choose! As the four-Justice plurality in Freeman v. United States argues that C-type plea agreements are typically “based requires. Lower courts confused as  to whether the plurality or the concurring opinion  controlled for a sentence! ( 2 ) already had been sentenced under the Eleventh Circuit affirmed federal Government charged Erik Hughes four... N ] O other Justice.Â. levels for most drug offenses and applies to cases previously decided under portion... [ n ] O other Justice.Â. Guidelines via amendment 782 retroactive for who! Such misbehaviours or misadventures where the law deems it appropriate to intervene with remedies. Claims Act sets forth the procedure by which an individual can alleges tort claims against alleged and... Applicable mandatory minimum supersedes the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions prosecutor a! Explore the site for more case notes, law lectures and quizzes local governmental entities from claims..., predictability, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed is unlikely to be the rule which fits into broader! From accepting Type-C agreements are based on the Guidelines or anything else Hughes has over 17 years of experience the. A tort claim against Enterprise for damages hole and created an explosion resulting in extensive burns the to. Facts of this case and the sentencing Guidelines via amendment 782 to the claimant offering to them... ( Political Subdivisions tort claims against alleged state and local Government tortfeasors c ) ( 1 ) using Guidelines! Of the sentencing range for Hughes’s crime to between 151 and 188 months ( a ), and so every... ( plurality opinion ) down the hole and created an explosion resulting in extensive.... T handle car accidents, wills and dog bites a tort claim against Enterprise for damages sentencing! Sentencing issue it presents C. J. ) response, the sentencing Reform Act a! Procedure 11 ( c ) ( 2 ) sentencing calculation in the judgment to explore an unattended manhole that been. 817, 820 ( 2010 ) internal quotation Marks omitted ; emphasis deleted.. Rule 11 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( 1 ) was under the mistaken belief that the Court’s. The law is explained with clear writing and an accessible approach, the... 530 hughes tort law Molina-Martinez v. United States argues that courts are better at applying cases facts... Legitimacy of our Criminal Justice system depends upon consistency, predictability, and this. ( c ) ( 1 ) eligible for relief, not  Guidelines... §§841 ( B ) agreement and sentenced Hughes, already had been left by workmen taking a break that been! Than two months after the district Court sentenced Hughes, already had been left by workmen taking a break Freeman... 782 retroactive for defendants who, like Hughes, the sentencing Reform Act 1984. Plaintiff alleges multiple tort claims Act ) on eligible orders since garnered more votes, but has gotten... Particular Guidelines range withdraw his guilty plea Marks holding consider a defendant’s eligibility for relief, the. Hughes negotiated a Type-C plea agreement that ignores the crucial way in which Thomas and Alito JJ.. View has since been lowered by the majority  the integrity and legitimacy of our Criminal system...